Why did Indonesia support the Nuclear Iranian Proliferation? (2)

The indication not looked by eyes towards this West policy could be seen from the difference of the standard of the attitude and the intensity of the US manoeuvre in the nuclear North Korean crisis resolution.
For the USA, Iran as a nuclear strength bigger his danger towards the security complex and the Israeli security curtain, as the only nuclear strength in the Middle East, compared to North Korea.
The West concern based in the Ahmadinejad statement that wanted to "remove Isreal from the world map", that West that must "be responsible for the occurrence holocaust, not the Palestinian nation", that "one day later Israel will be destroyed"," et cetera.
The combination of the figure a person of Ahmadinejad with the nuclear Iranian strength, widely accumulated this concern.
West did not trust Iran if his capacity to enrich uranium in the level of the energy generator will stop at this level, but will be continued to engineer the nuclear bomb, one Charges that constantly it was denied by by Tehran.

Till at this time, the war vein-condition was increasingly intense. The USA not mengenyampingkan attack-sudden against Iran. On the other hand, if being attacked, Tehran stressed Iran will attack all the US interests all over the corner of the world and of course, Israel. US efforts in the UN Security Council to pass the resolution for Iran failed to get the round support. Currently, the solution towards the crisis experienced the impasse. The side's majority that quarrelled including Tehran, Washington, London and Paris saw that the diplomacy gap was still being open. The solution to the military will not resolve the problem.

Estimated if this military option was taken by the USA and his ally, his effect will really be different from the success of the attack-sudden action that was carried out by Israel towards nuclear Osirak facilities.
In the Osirak case, Iraq did not have kepabilitas the military that was adequate to do attack-returned towards the action punitive that was carried out by Israel because of being tired in the Iraq-Iran War.
By that, the internal support for Saddam Hussein's regime already terfregmentasi and not cohesive, as well as the absence of the strong ideological support.
Tehran apparently currently had all the aspects of the capability above.
In the case of this nuclear Iranian proliferation, the Indonesian position was enough dilematis.
This was caused by the level of the Indonesian dependence on West still was high on the one hand, whereas on the other hand, Indonesia was the country that had a population of the biggest Muslim majority in the world.
This position made Indonesia give the support that was conditional to Iran in his nuclear program.
Indonesia only supported Tehran to the best of this nuclear proliferation program only for the interests of peace that is as the source of alternative energy.
Jakarta did not support Tehran if this technology was developed into the nuclear bomb.
The support kondisional Indonesia was to prevent so that West not teralienasi.
On the other hand, if Jakarta refused the Iranian plan absolutely then the action could reduce the support of Moslems's majority for the government.
By that, supported the proliferation of Iranian peace also to have the strategic foundation because Indonesia will do the same thing with the same aim.
Afterwards, refused to support Tehran to cause difficulties for Indonesia to secure the fresh investment fund valuable around 600 million the US dollar in country sector given like with Iranian.

The last reason above was significant enough in influencing the Indonesian attitude.
Results of the survey that was dismissed by LP3ES, on April 24 2006, the production of Indonesian FUEL OIL 1,055 million barrel per the day.
Whereas the requirement for domestic Indonesian FUEL OIL for the daily reached 1,35 million barrel.
So, had the deficit around 300.
000 barrel per the day, that till at this time was covered with the import BBM. in the period 2000-2004, LP3ES predicted the loss cost resulting from the difference thought export-import that reached Rp.
12,2 trillion.
In this conflict, Indonesia also took the attitude refused the option or the military action against Iran.
Firstly, because of Indonesia still the trauma with pretext that was worn to attack and occupy Iraq that evidently did not find stock of weapons of mass destruction.
Jakarta worried the similar case could be repeated to Iran.
Secondly, this option could have a negative impact on the domestic Indonesian stability.
Thirdly, this action could make Indonesian efforts to become the mediator in various global rumours resulting from the incident on September 11 2001 more difficult.
The position and the attitude above perhaps has been in the point that was optimal in the context of Indonesian foreign policy.
This pragmatism beresonansi with the long creed Indonesian foreign policy that was introduced by Bung Hatta in 1948 that was "free" and "active".
"Free" here was not significant "neutral" or took the "distance that was same" in sharing the problem of the world, but "being active" in the contribution found the best solution, definitely in the continuity and Indonesian welfare.
To achieve the two last aims to raison d'etre from foreign policy of each country.
Gunaryadi, the Chairman of the Study Field of Social Science of Institute for Science and Technology Studies (ISTECS) the Netherlands; taught in the KBRI School in Wassenaar.
Enamel: gunyaya@yahoo.com